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Abstract
Does external monitoring improve democratic performance? Fact-checking
has come to play an increasingly important role in political coverage in the
United States, but research suggests it may be ineffective at reducing public
misperceptions about controversial issues. However, fact-checking might in-
stead help improve political discourse by increasing the reputational costs or
risks of spreading misinformation for political elites. To evaluate this deter-
rent hypothesis, we conducted a field experiment in nine U.S. states in which
a randomly assigned group of state legislators were sent a series of letters
about the risks to their reputation and electoral security if they are caught
making questionable statements. The legislators who were sent these letters
were substantially less likely to receive a negative fact-checking rating or to
have their accuracy questioned publicly, suggesting that the threat posed by
fact-checking can reduce inaccuracy in statements made by political elites.
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To what extent can external monitoring increase political accountability and
improve democratic outcomes? Social scientists are increasingly using field exper-
iments to understand the ways in which monitoring can shape political and bureau-
cratic behavior (e.g., Duflo, Hanna, and Rya 2012; Olken 2007; Ferraz and Finan
2008; Grose N.d.; Butler 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein N.d.; Malesky, Schuler,
and Tran 2012). One important source of external monitoring for politicians in free
societies is the press. In the United States, several fact-checking organizations have
begun to systematically evaluate the accuracy of statements made by politicians
at the national and state level using a journalistic approach (Graves and Glaisyer
2012), but little systematic evidence exists on the effectiveness of this practice.
Research in political science and psychology suggests a number of reasons for
skepticism that fact-checking will successfully reduce public misperceptions (for
reviews, see Nyhan and Reifler 2012 and Lewandowsky et al. 2012). First, people
often seek to avoid unwelcome information about politics, which may reduce ex-
posure to fact-checks that challenge their existing beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006;
Stroud 2008; Iyengar et al. 2008; Iyengar and Hahn 2009).1 In addition, corrections
may be ineffective or even make misperceptions worse among individuals who do
encounter counter-attitudinal corrective information about controversial issues (Ny-
han and Reifler 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013).
It is possible, however, that fact-checking might have positive effects on elite
behavior by increasing the reputational costs or risks of spreading misinformation
(Nyhan 2010). Though a pollster for a U.S. presidential candidate famously said
1One study found that visitors to fact-checking websites show higher levels of factual knowledge
controlling for certain observable characteristics (Gottfried et al. 2013), but these differences could
reflect self-selection among the fact-checking audience rather than causal effects.
1
“We’re not going to let our campaign be dictated by fact checkers” (Smith 2012)
and some pundits have written off the practice as ineffective at the presidential
level (Carr 2012; Balz 2012), the fact that factually questionable statements con-
tinue to be made does not demonstrate that fact-checking is ineffective. The rele-
vant question is whether more misleading or inaccurate statements would be made
in the absence of fact-checkers. Just as greater accountability could help pundits
make more accurate predictions (Tetlock 2005), scrutiny from fact-checkers could
increase politicians’ concerns about accuracy and encourage them to make fewer
misleading or inaccurate statements. Previous research indicates that elected offi-
cials are very concerned about threats to their re-election (Mayhew 1974; Fenno
2002). While most fact-checking likely has little effect on a politician’s re-election
prospects, monitoring by fact-checkers should increase the perceived risk of a dam-
aging disclosure, particularly for Congressional or state candidates who attract less
media coverage and advertise less extensively than presidential candidates.
To evaluate this deterrent hypothesis, we conducted the first field experiment to
evaluate the effect of fact-checking in nine U.S. states before the November 2012
general election. In this experiment, we randomized whether or not state legisla-
tors were sent a series of letters designed to increase legislators’ concerns about
accuracy and the potential electoral and reputational consequences of being fact-
checked. Because we conducted the study in states where PolitiFact state affiliates
were operating, the threat that dubious claims could be exposed should have been
credible. Our results indicate that state legislators who were sent letters about the
threat posed by fact-checkers were less likely to have their claims questioned as
misleading or inaccurate during the fall campaign—a promising sign for journalis-
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tic monitoring in democratic societies.
The effect of fact-checking on politicians
While major news organizations in the United States have long sought to ensure the
accuracy of the facts that they report (e.g., quoting public figures correctly), they
frequently refrain from questioning the accuracy of contested claims made by public
figures even when the statements are verifiable—a practice that media often critics
attribute to the journalistic norm of objectivity (e.g., Cunningham 2003). Politicians
appear to exploit this norm, which enables them to publicize questionable claims
with little risk of being contradicted (e.g., Fritz, Keefer, and Nyhan 2004).
The fact-checking movement takes a very different approach in focusing ex-
clusively on evaluating the accuracy of claims made by politicians and political
elites. Fact-checking by the three elite fact-checkers (PolitiFact and its state affili-
ates, Factcheck.org, and theWashington Post Fact Checker) and other media organi-
zations has come to play an increasingly important role in political coverage in the
United States (Graves and Glaisyer 2012) and is now beginning to expand abroad
(Adair 2013; Alcorn 2013). This movement represents a potentially radical change
in how journalism is practiced with significant consequences for political account-
ability and democratic discourse. Rather than limiting itself to the “he said,” “she
said” coverage and horse race analysis that dominate traditional political news, the
fact-checkers devote their energies and resources to scrutinizing what politicians
say and rendering public judgments about the correctness of their claims.
What effects does fact-checking have on politicians? This question has not
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been examined systematically, but previous research suggests that legislators may
be sensitive to media scrutiny of the sort that fact-checkers provide. The literature
on Congressional behavior shows that legislators are concerned about re-election
and engage in risk-averse behavior to minimize potential electoral or reputational
threats (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 2002). One potential threat that elected officials
may be concerned about is critical media coverage. Studies have found that cov-
erage levels of politicians vary widely (Arnold 2004; Campante and Do 2013) and
that those differences in coverage can have significant consequences for the in-
cumbency advantage in elections (Prior 2006; Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido 2009;
Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011), legislator performance in office (Snyder
and Stro¨mberg 2010), and possibly even state-level patterns of corruption (Cam-
pante and Do 2013). Fact-checking thus has the potential to create career risks for
politicians by generating negative coverage for politicians that could damage their
reputation and credibility. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some candidates seek
to avoid the negative ratings given out by fact-checkers or alter claims that come un-
der fire, though others disavow such concerns (Graves 2013; Gottfried et al. 2013).
Experimental design
Observational analyses of the effects of fact-checking on politician behavior could
easily lead to incorrect conclusions. For instance, fact-checks may be more widely
used in states that already had stronger accuracy norms in public discourse, a con-
found which might falsely suggest that fact-checking reduced inaccuracy in those
states. Alternatively, fact-checks might seem to be ineffective because certain leg-
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islators keep making questionable statements despite receiving negative ratings, but
we cannot determine which legislators are not making such statements because of
the presence of fact-checkers using observational data alone.
To overcome these inferential difficulties, we conducted a field experiment in
fall 2012 in nine U.S. states in which PolitiFact affiliates were operating (Florida,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wis-
consin), excluding only the two states where the authors are based (Georgia and
New Hampshire) due to concerns about treatment effect heterogeneity. (See Sup-
porting Materials [SM] for the distribution of legislators across states.) Because
we could not randomize the activities of fact-checking organizations, we instead
employed randomized correspondence, which has frequently been used in previ-
ous field experimental studies of elite political behavior (Bergan 2009; Broockman
2013; Butler and Broockman 2011; Butler and Nickerson 2011; Butler, Karpowitz,
and Pope 2012; Loewen and MacKenzie N.d.; Loewen and Rubenson 2011; Mc-
Clendon N.d.). In this case, we randomized whether legislators were sent a series
of letters about the reputational or electoral consequences of receiving a negative
rating from a fact-checking organization.
We chose to conduct our study with state legislators for several reasons. First,
we could assemble a very large sample — far larger than would be possible in
the U.S. Congress. Second, theory suggests that state legislators should be more
sensitive to an individual fact-check than a member of Congress because they are
covered by the media less frequently, which means that a single bad story or nega-
tive rating will be a larger proportion of their total coverage. State legislators also
have more limited financial resources and thus cannot rely on televised advertising
5
or direct mail to the same extent as members of Congress. By targeting a lower-
level politician in this way, we increase the effect of our treatment. Finally, it was
more feasible to reach state legislators through correspondence than members of
Congress, who typically have much larger offices and more professional staff and
interns. In a Congressional office, for instance, it would be rare for a legislator to
directly open and read incoming mail, which is primarily handled by staff whose
primary responsibility is constituent correspondence. Our mailings would there-
fore be unlikely to have any direct effect on Congressional behavior. However,
state legislators often have few or no professional staff, substantially increasing the
likelihood that they would encounter and read our mailings.
Experimental conditions
Our experiment randomized whether state legislators were sent a series of letters
about the reputational or electoral consequences of fact-checking. 1169 legislators
from the nine states in our sample2 were randomly assigned to one of three condi-
tions: a treatment condition in which legislators were sent letters reminding them
of the risks to their reputation and electoral security if they are caught making ques-
tionable statements, a placebo (Hawthorne) condition in which legislators were sent
letters stating that we were monitoring campaign accuracy, and a control condition.
While legislators of course vary in the likelihood that they will make misleading
or inaccurate statements or be the target of fact-checking, this randomization pro-
cedure (which is described further below) ensures that these individual-level dif-
ferences are independent of treatment assignment, which allows us to obtain an
2See SM for the distribution of legislators across states.
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unbiased estimate of the treatment effect.
Specifically, legislators in the treatment and placebo (Hawthorne) conditions
were sent three separate mailings (mail dates: August 23, September 18, and Octo-
ber 12, 2012), while those in the control condition were not contacted. Because the
state legislatures in question were out of session during our study, we sent a copy
of each mailing to legislators’ capitol and district addresses (see SM for details).
Treatment condition
In the treatment condition, legislators were sent a series of letters that emphasized
the risks of having misleading or inaccurate statements exposed by fact-checkers.
The treatment mailing to legislators had several key elements: (1) a reminder of the
presence of a PolitiFact affiliate in their state to establish the credibility of the threat
of being fact-checked; (2) a description of the potential electoral and reputational
consequences of negative fact-check ratings; and (3) two sample PolitiFact “pants
on fire” fact-checks (balanced by party) to heighten legislators’ concerns about be-
ing fact-checked from one of the states excluded from our study. (See SM for the
full text of a sample letter.)
Hawthorne (placebo) condition
In addition to our treatment letter, we designed a placebo letter that alerted leg-
islators that we were conducting a study of the accuracy of statements made by
politicians, but excluded any language about fact-checking or the consequences of
inaccurate statements. We included this additional condition to account for what is
known as a Hawthorne effect—the tendency for experimental participants to behave
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differently when they know they are being studied, which can confound treatment
effect estimates (Levitt and List 2011). By including a placebo condition, we can
determine whether legislators responded to the specific content of the treatment let-
ter or the fact that they were being studied. (See SM for full text of a sample letter.)
Control condition
Legislators in the control condition were not sent mailings or contacted in any way.
Randomization and balance
Using the R package blockTools (Moore N.d.), we block randomized assign-
ment to ensure perfect balance between conditions on state, political party, legisla-
tive chamber (state house/state senate), and whether or not a legislator had previ-
ously received a PolitiFact rating. We also used multivariate continuous blocking to
maximize balance between conditions on two continuous covariates that could be
related to being fact-checked: previous vote share and fundraising (Moore 2012).
In this way, we sought to minimize variance in factors other than our experimental
conditions that would influence whether or not legislators would be fact-checked
during the study period, which increases the precision of experimental treatment
effect estimates (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007).
This block randomization resulted in near-perfect balance between conditions
among the 1169 legislators included in the study, as Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate.3
Importantly, this blocking also results in balance on observables that were not in-
3Of the 1197 legislators in our sample, 1169 were randomized within 69 blocks; 28 were dropped
to maximize balance. Of the 69 blocks formed, 50 had equal numbers of legislators in each condition
and 19 had one fewer legislator in a single condition.
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clude in the blocking like being a party leader or a committee chair.4
Table 1: Covariate balance by experimental condition
Treatment Placebo/Control
GOP 0.56 0.56
State senate 0.26 0.26
Previous fact-check 0.21 0.21
Log fundraising 11.6 11.5
Previous voteshare 71.6 71.3
Party leader 0.07 0.07
Committee leader 0.53 0.51
(weighted means)
Estimand: Assignment to treatment condition
Because it is impossible to know with certainty which legislators read the treatment
letter, our experiment estimates the effect of being assigned to the treatment con-
dition. As a partial indicator of which legislators read our mailings (and to further
indicate the importance of the letter), we asked recipients of treatment and placebo
letters to sign and return an enclosed postage-paid acknowledgment postcard. How-
ever, those postcards cannot be used to estimate the actual effect of reading the
treatment letter. First, many legislators may have read the letter but not bothered to
return the postcard. In addition, the postcards themselves provide suggestive evi-
dence that the content of the treatment letter had a significant effect—only 21% of
legislators in the treatment group returned a signed postcard compared to 34% of
4Texas state representative J.M. Lozano was mistakenly coded as a Democrat; he actually
switched to the Republican Party in spring 2012. The randomization procedure was carried out
with him coded as a Democrat. After his affiliation was corrected, however, the sample remains
balanced by party (56% in both the treatment and placebo/control conditions).
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Figure 1: Covariate balance: Vote share and fundraising (log)
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those in the placebo condition, suggesting that it may have displeased its recipients
(p < .01; see SM). Alternatively, we could use successful delivery of the letter
as an indicator of treatment receipt, but only 0.4% (n = 18) of our 4,661 letters
were returned as undeliverable, so the treatment effect estimates would be virtually
identical. We therefore estimate the expected difference in outcomes resulting from
assignment to the treatment condition (rather than receipt of treatment).5
In addition, we assume that outcomes are unaffected by the experimental condi-
5However, we summarize what our estimates would be for the average treatment effect on the
treated under different assumptions about the (unmeasurable) probability that legislators actually
received the treatment in the results section below.
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tions to which other legislators are assigned. A violation of this assumption would
occur, for example, if a legislator who received our treatment letter showed the let-
ter to a legislator in the control group and thereby affected the likelihood that she
would make misleading or inaccurate statements. We believe this assumption is
justified for two reasons. First, all of the state legislatures in our study were out of
session during the study period, which should have dispersed legislators across their
districts, substantially reducing the opportunity for treatment spillover. In addition,
any spillover would bias our treatment effects toward zero, reducing the likelihood
that we would find significant effects.
Outcome measures
Due to the complexities of language and politics, no perfectly objective measure
of statement accuracy has yet been created. It was also infeasible to code every
statement during the study period by all the state legislators in our data, especially
since most are unobservable to researchers. As such, we examine three measures
of public criticism by fact-checkers or others that question the validity or accuracy
of statements made by state legislators in our sample. Such factual criticism should
be more likely as the frequency of misleading or inaccurate statements by state
legislators in our sample increases.
The first dependent variable is whether a legislator received a negative rating
from the PolitiFact affiliate in their state.6 PolitiFact uses a six-point scale to rate
the accuracy of statements, ranging from “True” to “Pants on Fire.” Because our
6The PolitiFact affiliates were not aware of our experiment or the treatment conditions to which
legislators were assigned except in one case discussed in the SM.
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unit of analysis is the state legislator, we created a binary measure (Negative Politi-
Fact rating) of whether a state legislator was rated by PolitiFact as having made a
misleading or inaccurate statement during the study period of August 24–November
6, 2012. This measure, which is based on PolitiFact’s description of the meaning of
their rating categories, takes a value of 1 if the state legislator received a rating of
“half true” (“partially accurate but leaves out important details or takes things out
of context”), “mostly false” (“contains some element of truth but ignores critical
facts that would give a different impression”), “false” (“not accurate”), or “pants
on fire” (“not accurate and makes a ridiculous claim”) during the study period and
0 otherwise, which could include PolitiFact ratings of “true” or “mostly true” or,
most commonly, if the legislator had no statements publicly evaluated by PolitiFact
(PolitiFact.com N.d.).
One potential concern is whether PolitiFact truth ratings are consistent and ac-
curate. The franchise training model used by PolitiFact for its state affiliates suggest
that these ratings should be comparable across states (Myers N.d.; Nyhan 2013a).
While individual fact-checks sometimes veer into punditry or semantic disputes
(Marx 2012; Nyhan 2012, 2013b), an academic analysis of the ratings by elite fact-
checking organizations finds a very high level of agreement when they evaluate
identical or similar claims (Amazeen 2012, 66–68).
For our second dependent variable, a research assistant who was blind to the
experimental randomization performed a search of LexisNexis Academic for me-
dia coverage in which the accuracy of specific claims made by a legislator were
questioned. This Accuracy questioned measure is coded 1 if the research assistant
found one or more articles or blog posts published during the study period in which
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specific factual claims made by the legislator were questioned by the author or other
sources (including citations of past PolitiFact ratings) and 0 otherwise (intercoder
reliability: 95% agreement, Krippendorff’s alpha=.876; see SM for further details
on the search protocol, coding procedure, and types of articles found).
The third dependent variable is a binary measure that combines the first two
dependent variables. It is coded as 1 if the accuracy of a statement by the legislator
was questioned by PolitiFact or in an article in LexisNexis and 0 otherwise.
Results
Even with a dataset of nearly 1200 state legislators across nine states, fact-checks
were relatively rare — only 27 state legislators in our data received ratings from
PolitiFact state affiliates during the study period. Of these, 16 were “half true” or
worse. Even with such small numbers, however, an inspection of the marginal dis-
tributions suggest that assignment to treatment had a significant effect, reducing the
prevalence of negative ratings from 13 in the placebo and control conditions (1.7%)
to 3 in the treatment condition (0.8%). Likewise, the number of legislators who
had the accuracy of a claim questioned in media indexed in LexisNexis decreased
from 8 in the placebo and control conditions (1.0%) to 1 in the treatment group
(0.3%). There was no overlap in accuracy criticism between the measures. In all,
21 legislators in the placebo and control conditions had the accuracy of their claims
questioned by PolitiFact or in Nexis (2.7%) compared with 4 in the treatment con-
dition (1.0%).
To more formally evaluate our hypothesis, we estimated a series of weighted
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least squares regression models that account for the differing probability of treat-
ment across blocks, which is necessary to obtain an unbiased estimate of the aver-
age effect of assignment to treatment for our experiment (Gerber and Green 2012,
117).7 We found no significant differences between the placebo and control condi-
tions (see SM), suggesting that the differences in behavior we observe in the treat-
ment condition are due to the fact-checking content in those mailings rather than
a Hawthorne effect. To simplify exposition, we thus combine legislators in these
conditions in the analyses below and estimate treatment effects relative to the con-
trol and placebo conditions. (All analyses are robust to estimating treatment effects
relative to the placebo condition directly; see SM for details.)
In each model, we regressed our dependent variable on the treatment indicator
using weighted least squares. Table 2 presents weighted means for the treatment
and control groups as well as the results of these regression models, which estimate
the average effect of assigned to the treatment condition (the average treatment
effect [ATE]) on negative fact-checking ratings, other political figures, reporters,
or commentators questioning the accuracy of legislators’ claims, and a composite
indicator for both outcome measures.
Our results indicate that legislators who were sent our treatment letters were
substantially less likely to receive negative PolitiFact rating or to have their accu-
racy questioned publicly. While the treatment effect falls just short of significance
at the p < .05 (one-tailed) for the negative PolitiFact rating, the effect is in the ex-
pected direction. For the Accuracy questioned variable, the treatment is significant
7Specifically, we follow Gerber and Green (2012) and weight treated observations by the inverse
probability of treatment within each block while weighting placebo/control observations by 1/(1-
probability of treatment within each block). These weights were used in the weighted least squares
regression estimates presented in the article text and supplementary materials.
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Table 2: Treatment effects of fact-checking threat letter
Weighted means Risk reduction
Outcome Treatment Control ATE p-val. Absolute Relative
Negative PF rating 0.008 0.017 -0.009 .072 -0.9% -55%
(0.006)
Acc. questioned 0.003 0.010 -0.008 .042 -0.8% -75%
(0.004)
Combined measure 0.010 0.027 -0.017 .013 -1.7% -63%
(0.007)
Study sample consists of 1169 state legislators from nine states. Weighted means provided for
treatment group and controls (the combined placebo/control group). Average treatment effect
(ATE) estimated using weighted least squares regression with robust standard errors in parentheses;
estimated p-values are one-sided due to the directional nature of our hypothesis. See text and
supplementary materials for further details on treatments and outcome measures.
at the p < .05 level. Finally, when we combine the two outcome measures into a
broader indicator of whether the accuracy of the legislator’s claims are questioned,
the treatment effect is highly significant (p < .02). These results are consistent in a
series of robustness checks presented in the SM (restricting the Negative PolitiFact
rating measure to only take a value of 1 for “mostly false”, “false”, and “pants on
fire” ratings; estimating treatment effects relative to the placebo condition; using
logistic regression instead of weighted least squares; including block fixed effects;
and using standard errors that are clustered by block).
In addition to the estimated treatment effects and standard errors, Table 2 also
provides the absolute and relative magnitudes of the changes in predicted proba-
bility. Because we used a least squares estimator on a binary outcome measure,
the treatment effect can be directly interpreted as a difference in means. The coef-
ficients thus tells us how much the treatment reduced the probability of a negative
outcome relative to the combined Hawthorne and control conditions. The estimated
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absolute risk reductions are relatively low (0.8–1.7%) due to the infrequency with
which state legislators were rated by PolitiFact or had their statements questioned in
media or online outlets — a base rate that almost certainly understates the propor-
tion of politicians who make misleading or inaccurate claims. By contrast, the esti-
mated relative risk reductions in Table 2 are much larger (55–75%), suggesting that
the actual treatment effects are substantial. To highlight the extent of the relative
risk reduction, Figure 2 contrasts the weighted means for our composite measure of
reported inaccuracy between the treatment and placebo/control groups—a relative
risk reduction of 63%.
Figure 2: Probability of accuracy criticism (PolitiFact/LexisNexis)
*
0%
1%
2%
3%
Control/placebo Treatment
Legislators assigned to treatment condition are less likely to receive accuracy criticism. Study
sample consists of 1169 state legislators from nine states. Weighted probabilities provided for
treatment and placebo/control group. See text and supplementary materials for further details on
treatments and outcome measures.
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To rule out the possibility that these effects were the result of the treatment sup-
pressing public statements by legislators more generally, we estimated weighted
least squares regression models of the probability of receiving any rating from Poli-
tiFact, the total number of articles found for each legislator in Nexis excluding the
accuracy-related keywords used in Accuracy questioned, and the number of pages
on each legislator’s website when scraped approximately one week after the elec-
tion (a proxy for the total volume of content provided). As Table 3 indicates, none
of these results were statistically significant, suggesting that the treatment did not
suppress speech, but changed it.
Table 3: Treatment effects for indicators of volume of speech
Model Received PF rating Total Nexis articles Number webpages
Treatment -0.003 1.803 0.075
(0.008) (1.221) (3.131)
Constant 0.021 9.317 21.354
(0.005) (0.605) (2.099)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 1169 1169 789
Weighted least squares regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of webpages
calculated as the number of files ending in .html, .shtml, .php, .htm, .asp, or .php that were success-
fully scraped by an automated program on November 13, 2012 from the candidate’s website when
one could be located. Facebook or Twitter accounts were excluded.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that our experiment estimates the effect of
assigning a legislator to the treatment condition. The magnitude of the effect of
actually reading the letter increases as the proportion of legislators in the treatment
condition who were not successfully reached increases. We cannot observe this
quantity, but Figure 3 illustrates how the estimated effect of receiving the treatment
increases as the assumed level of non-compliance increases. As reference points,
it provides three possible measures of this unknown quantity based on the rate at
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which recipients of treatment and placebo letters signed and returned an enclosed
postage-paid acknowledgment postcard or the proportion of letters that were not
returned as undeliverable.
Figure 3: Effect of reading treatment letter on treated legislators (PF/Nexis)
Postcard return rate: Treatment condition
Postcard return rate: Placebo condition
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Possible range of absolute effect estimates for the average effect of treatment on the treated.
Calculated by dividing the effect size from combined PolitiFact/LexisNexis measure in Table 2 by
the hypothetical proportion of legislators in treatment condition who actually read the letter. See
text and supplementary materials for further details on treatments and outcome measures.
The magnitude of the average treatment effect on the treated is easily calcu-
lated under various assumptions about the ratio of legislators who were successfully
treated (the treatment effect for all others is assumed to be zero). For instance, if
50% of legislators in the treatment group did not read the letter, the treatment effect
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on the combined measure for those who did read the letter is twice as large as the
effect of assignment to treatment (-1.7%/.5 = -3.4%). Similarly, the effect is four
times as large if 75% did not read the letter (-1.7%/.25 = -6.8%).
Discussion
Does external monitoring reduce inaccuracy in statements made by political elites?
In the first field experiment of its kind, we find that the randomized provision of a
series of letters highlighting the electoral and reputational risks of having question-
able statements exposed by fact-checkers significantly reduced the likelihood that
legislators in nine U.S. states would receive a negative fact-checking rating or have
the accuracy of their claims questioned publicly. We found no evidence that these
results were driven by legislators speaking less frequently or receiving less cov-
erage, suggesting instead that they were less likely to make inaccurate statements
rather than being silenced more generally.
Moreover, these results, while encouraging, may understate the magnitude of
the potential effects of fact-checking on the behavior of politicians or other elites.
First, we can only estimate the effect of being assigned to receive the treatment
letter. It is unlikely that every state legislator to whom we sent the treatment letter
received it and read it carefully. If the negative consequences of inaccurate state-
ments were salient and accessible to all elites, the potential effects on their behavior
would likely be even larger. In addition, the magnitude of the treatment effects are
scaled relative to the low base rate of fact-checking or articles questioning a leg-
islator’s accuracy, which is likely to capture only a tiny fraction of the deceptive
19
or inaccurate statements that politicians make. If the frequency of inaccurate state-
ments is much higher in practice, our relative risk reduction estimates suggest that
the potential effect of fact-checking threat is sizable.
Future research should investigate the mechanisms by which fact-checking change
elite behavior and the extent to which they are captured in our experimental design.
For instance, fact-checkers may change elite behavior by increasing the perceived
risks of making misleading claims and/or priming normative concerns about truth-
fulness. Our experimental design does not allow us to evaluate potential mediators,
though our treatment letter could plausibly have both effects. Another possibility
is that the effects of fact-checking may vary due to state-level or contextual factors
such as whether the legislature is in session. With only nine states in our sample (all
of which were out of session during our study), we cannot answer these questions,
but they are worth considering as fact-checking continues to expand.
More generally, these results indicate that fact-checking should not be discred-
ited by the continued prevalence of misinformation and misperceptions. While fact-
checking may be ineffective at changing public opinion, its role as a monitor of elite
behavior may justify the continued investment of philanthropic and journalistic re-
sources. Indeed, given the very small numbers of legislators whose accuracy is
currently being questioned by fact-checkers or other sources, one could argue that
fact-checking should be expanded in the U.S. so that it can provide more extensive
and consistent monitoring to politicians at all levels of government.
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